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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 950057-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim.

P. 26(2) (a) .
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief
or in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const, art. I, § 7
Const, art. I, § 12
Const, art. VIII, § 5
Const, art. VIII, § 7
Const, amend. V
R. App. P. 4
R. Civ. P. 52(a)
R. Civ. P. 81(e)
R. Crim. P. 9.5
R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5)
R. Crim. P. 26(7)
Code Ann. § 76-1-401
Code Ann. § 76-1-402
Code Ann. § 76-1-403
Code Ann. § 76-1-601
Code Ann. § 76-6-408
Code Ann. § 76-6-408

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Salt
Salt

Code
Code
Code
Code
Lake
Lake

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
City
City

§ 76-6-412
§ 76-10-504
§ 77-1-6(2) (a)
§ 77-35-9.5
Ordinance 11.48.040
Ordinance 11.48.070

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in basing its factual

findings and legal conclusions on unproven claims and on
matters outside of the record?

"Findings of fact are clearly

erroneous if it can be shown that they are without adequate
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous
view of the law."

Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Smith,

Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial
courts do not have discretion to misapply the law").
2.

Did the trial court misinterpret the rules,

statutes and constitutional authority governing double
jeopardy and the single criminal episode statute?

"Since

questions of constitutional rights are questions of law, we
give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . . "
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); Gravson
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989) ("A
trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular
deference"); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.)
("When examining a trial court's interpretation of a statutory
provision we apply a correction of error standard"), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
Due to the promulgation of a new rule, Utah R. Crim.
P. 9.5, which has not been interpreted judicially in Utah,
Mr. Williams7 single criminal episode issue addresses the
applicable authority in a manner different from relevant
precedent.

A state constitutional analysis is also being

advanced for the first time with authorities not previously
considered on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
attempted theft by receiving, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3); 76-6-408;
76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) . See. (R 6, 8, 21, 99) . On November 17,
1994, Mr. Jason Scott Williams entered a conditional guilty
plea to the above offense, reserving his right to appeal the
involved issues.

(R 88-95).

On December 6,1994, the court sentenced Mr. Williams
to an indeterminate term "not to exceed five years" in the
Utah State Prison, together with a $5000 fine.

(R 99).

The

sentence was immediately stayed, however, in favor of a 36
month period of probation.

(R 99-100).

Other procedural facts are in dispute and will be more
fully set forth in the "Statement of Facts" and "Argument"
portions of the brief.

The filed pleadings included the

following: On November 18, 1994, the trial court signed
"Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
3

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss".

(R 96-98).

"Amended Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law" were later signed by the court
on January 6, 1995, (R 136-39), following objections and
proposals by both parties.

(R 101-29).

After an extension of

time for filing the notice of appeal, (R 130-31: 152-54); see
Utah R. App. P. 4(e), Mr. Williams filed this appeal.
(R 140-41).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 18, 1994, the court first signed "Findings
of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss", (R 96-98), which read in pertinent part as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 3, 1994, Jason Williams was charged by
Salt Lake City in a three count information with two counts
of carrying a loaded firearm, in violation of Salt Lake
City Ordinance 11.48.040, and one count of carrying a
concealed weapon, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
11.40.070 in Salt Lake City v. Jason Williams, case number
941016768.
2. He was arraigned on October 4, 1994, and pled to
one count of carrying a loaded firearm and one count of
carrying a concealed weapon.
3. He was sentenced by Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey
on November 2, 1994.
4. In this case, the State filed an information on
October 4, 1994, charging Mr. Williams with theft by
receiving stolen property, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
section 76-6-4 [10], and carrying a concealed weapon, a
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-504.
5. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the count
alleging carrying a concealed weapon, and the motion was
granted.
6. Both cases are premised on facts allegedly
occurring on October 1, 1994, wherein the police conducted
a warrantless search of a car containing two loaded
firearms.
7. Both cases were filed in the Third Circuit Court
before Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey.
4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Because the elements of the offenses in the City
case are different from the elements of the offense charged
in the State case, there is no violation of the defendant's
rights against double jeopardy.
2. Because the offenses charged in the City case and
the offense charged in the State case did not occur in the
same criminal episode, there is no violation of the Utah
statutes pertaining to prosecutions of single criminal
episodes.
(R 96-98) (attached as Addendum B ) .
Following objections and proposals to the findings and
conclusions, on January 6, 1995, the court signed "Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law".

(R 136-39); see also

(R 13 0) (Amended Findings were needed to perfect the appeal).

In

contrast to the initial findings, however, the Amended Findings
and Conclusions were adopted from the State's unsubstantiated
oral representations.

Compare (R 137-39) (Addendum C ) , with

(R 163-39) .
During the motion to dismiss proceeding for the double
jeopardy issue, the State attempted to supplement the record with
nothing more than its oral representations.

"There are a couple

of things I [the State] would like to supplement the record with
vis-a-vis the facts in this case."

(R 163).

Defense counsel is right, the defendant was charged and
booked into jail the evening of October the 1st on three
misdemeanors that are listed in the city's information.
He was originally booked on a class "A" misdemeanor on
the concealed weapon in a vehicle, or having a loaded
weapon in the vehicle. Unfortunately, the jail somehow, in
its paperwork, listed that as a class "B" misdemeanor.

5

The city prosecutor's office picked it up the next day.
It was not screened. It was just sent over by the jail; no
officer screened it.
And based upon the charges being there, the city
prosecutor's office issued the information that you have.
The defendant plead[ed] guilty to that information. On
approximately the 4th, I believe in front of Judge Casey,
it was not until the 4th that the weapons showed up on an
NCIC hit that it was stolen, and it was not until after the
defendant had already entered his guilty plea that the
State had knowledge that the gun was stolen.
So it was not until after those events, and the
defendant had already entered the guilty plea, that the
State had any basis to present its charges.
And as soon as that information was conveyed to the
officer, he found out it was listed in the NCIC as stolen,
a stolen gun, he came into my office and we filed the
second information that the court has before it.
(R 163-64) .
The State's claims were immediately challenged.

"Some of

the statements, factual statements, that [the State] made . . .
are things I'm [defense counsel] not aware of independently, and
I'm not willing to stipulate to them.
Mr. Williams was booked into the jail.
jail paperwork situation was.
situation was.

I don't know exactly how
I don't know what the

I don't know what the screening

All I know is the evidence I submitted to you,

that the police reports available to the city prosecutor are the
same as the police reports available to the State in this case."
(R 167); accord (R 120).
Despite the defense objections, the trial court adopted the
State's oral representations.

The matters outside of the record

evidence were incorporated into the Amended Findings and
Conclusions:
6

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 1, 1994, Detective Kent Cravens of the
Metro Gang Unit and other police officers responded to a
shots fired report. Five members of the gangs "QVO" or
"BMG" were detained by the police officers. The defendant
was one of the people detained.
2. A 1981 silver Datsun 310 car was parked nearby.
The defendant had driven the car to the area. Detective
Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun in the back seat area
of the car through the car's rear window. A search of the
car was performed by Detective Cravens and a loaded .357
Magnum revolver was found under the driver's floormat. The
defendant admitted that he was in possession of the .357
handgun and that the gun was "probably stolen." The .357
Magnum was not listed on NCIC as stolen at this time.
3. The defendant received and took possession of the
.357 handgun before he loaded it and concealed it in his
vehicle.
4. The defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt
Lake County Jail for Possession of a Concealed Weapon and
Possession of a Loaded Firearm in a Vehicle. Both of these
charges were misdemeanor Salt Lake City ordinance
violations.
5. On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's
Office filed an Information charging Scott Wilkerson, an
alias of the defendant, with one count of Carrying a
Concealed Dangerous Weapon and two counts of Carrying a
Loaded Firearm. Both charges are class B misdemeanor
violations of the city ordinances.
6. On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on
the city charges in front of Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey
and pled guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon and one count of Carrying a Loaded
Firearm. The third count was dismissed.
7. On October 4, 1994, Detective Cravens checked the
NCIC listings again and the .357 Magnum was listed as
stolen. Detective Cravens screened charges of Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, and
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A
misdemeanor, with the County Attorney's Office. The County
Attorney issued an Information charging the defendant with
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property.
8. On October 11, 1994, the County Attorney learned
about the defendant's guilty plea to the city charges and
dismissed the class A carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon
charge.
9. A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Pro Tern
Patrick Casey on October 18, 1994, and the defendant was
bound over to the district court on the second degree
felony charge of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.
7

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was
committed and completed when the defendant took possession
of the stolen .357 Magnum handgun.
2. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon
and Carrying a Loaded Firearm occurred and were completed
when the defendant loaded and concealed the .357 Magnum
handgun in the car that he was driving.
3\ The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was
completed before the defendant committed the crimes of
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded
Firearm.
4. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has
different elements than the crimes of Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm.
5. The jurisdiction for the second degree Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property is in the District Court. The
Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over the second
degree felony of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.
6. The Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute the second degree felony Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property charge. Jurisdiction to
prosecute this offense was only in the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office.
7. The offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property
was not known to the prosecution at the time that the
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charges were filed.
8. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is
a separate and distinct crime from the crimes of Carrying a
Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm.
9. The defendant was not placed in double jeopardy
under the clauses of either the Utah State Cons[t]itution
or the Federal Constitution.
10. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm were not committed as
part of the same criminal episode as the crime of Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property within the meaning of Section
76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended.
(R 136-39) (attached as Addendum C).
In line with his prior objections, (R 167-68), Mr. Williams
filed the following written objections to the Amended Findings
and Conclusions:

8

FINDINGS OF FACT
7. There was no evidence presented regarding when
Detective Cravens verified that the gun was stolen on NCIC,
or when he screened the case with the Salt Lake County
Attorney's office.
8. There was no evidence presented regarding when the
County Attorney learned about Mr. Williams' plea to the
city charges.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The crime of theft by receiving property was
occurring at the same time as the city misdemeanor weapons
offenses. Both the State and City Informations charge
October 1, 1994. Both Count I of the information in the
State case and the probable cause statement refer to the
facts on October 1, 1994 at 975 South and 3 00 West.
2. The crime of carrying a loaded firearm was
occurring on October 1, 1994, the same time as the theft by
receiving. It appears that the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon never occurred in this case, inasmuch as
there is no evidence that Mr. Williams carried the gun on
his person. Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070.
3. The crimes alleged in the city and state cases were
occurring simultaneously on October 1, 1994.
4. The circuit court magistrates had initial
jurisdiction over both the city and state charges, and the
district court had ultimate jurisdiction over the charges
in both cases.
5. While the city prosecutor's office had
discretionary jurisdiction over the city charges, the state
prosecutor's office had jurisdiction over all charges
contemplated in the city and state cases.
6. The prosecution had all the evidence necessary to
the theft by receiving charge at the time that the other
misdemeanor charges were filed.
(R 120-22) (attached as Addendum D ) .
Based on his objections and the lack of record evidence,
the Amended Findings are now challenged as being clearly
erroneous.

See infra Point I.

are also disputed.

The court's legal conclusions

(R 67-73; 156-72); Point II.

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State did not prove and the evidence did not establish
many of the factual and legal assertions argued orally by the
prosecution.

Without appropriately admitted supporting

evidence, the State's oral representations cannot be accepted as
true.

Moreover, the State's claims are clearly erroneous.
Utah's rules, statutes, and constitutional authority all

indicate that Mr. Williams was improperly convicted of the same
act arising out of a single criminal episode.

Having already

accepted responsibility for his admitted involvement, his two
uncounseled misdemeanor guilty pleas constituted a bar to any
further prosecutions.

Since the same factual contentions and

police reports were used in a subsequent prosecution, the State
cannot claim that newly filed charges were justified.

The court

erred in not dismissing a subsequently filed charge which had
already been resolved in a prior proceeding.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S FINDINGS LACKED AN ADEQUATE EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATION AND RELIED IMPROPERLY ON MATTERS OUTSIDE OF
THE RECORD AND UNPROVEN BY THE STATE
"Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown
that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are
induced by an erroneous view of the law."

Interiors Contracting Inc.

v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App.
1994).

The standard of review differs, though, where, as here,

appellate review is of a court's findings and not a jury's verdict:
10

[I]t is not accurate to say that the appellate court
takes that view of the evidence that is most favorable
to the appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in
the evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he
must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences.
All of this is true in reviewing a jury verdict. It is
not true when it is findings of the court that are
being reviewed. Instead, the appellate court may
examine all of the evidence in the record. It will
presume that the trial court relied only on evidence
properly admissible in making its finding in the
absence of a clear showing to the contrary. It must
given great weight to the findings made and the
inferences drawn by the trial judge, but it must
rejects his findings if it considers them to be clearly
erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added
and citation omitted); 1 see also id. ("A finding is 'clearly
erroneous7 when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed").
An "adequate evidentiary basis" requires more than
counsel's oral representations.

As explained by this Court in

Workman v. Nagle Constr., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990):
Workman's counsel represented at oral argument that
the condominium owners had actual knowledge of the
litigation in this case and notice to them would
therefore have arguably been a mere formality.
However, there is no evidence in the record to support
this representation of counsel. While we have no
particular reason to doubt it, there is nevertheless no
sufficient evidentiary basis to support a finding that
the condominium owners had actual knowledge of this
action, as counsel represented. We therefore lack the
factual predicate for taking up the issue whether
i

Although Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) provided the basis for the
quoted standard, "Rule 52(a) applies in criminal cases . . ."
Walker, 743 P.2d at 192; accord Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e); Utah R.
Crim. P. 26(7).
11

actual knowledge satisfies the right of the class
members to notice.
Workman, 802 P.2d at 753 (emphasis added and footnote omitted);
accord Redd v. Nealev, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989) (the "belief"
expressed by counsel provided an inadequate factual basis for an
objection).
In the case at bar, the State represented during oral
argument that it "would like to supplement the record with
vis-a-vis the facts in this case."

(R 163). However, the State

presented no witnesses in support of its claimed supplementation;
rather, it simply alleged a different version of the facts in an
attempt to bolster its argument.

(R 163-67).

In accordance with the marshalling requirement, see,
e.g., Interiors Contracting, 881 P.2d at 933, Mr. Williams
momentarily accepts the court's Amended Findings.
(Addendum C ) ; see supra Statement of Facts.

(R 136-3 9)

He further assumes,

as this Court did in Workman, that there is "no particular reason
to doubt it [counsel's representations]".

See 802 P.2d at 753.

As in Workman, however, such representations by counsel
nevertheless "lack the [necessary] factual predicate".

JEd; (R

136-39; 163-67).
"The representation of appellee's counsel that appellee
had a different version of the facts is not sufficient to support
the trial court's finding.

At best, that representation is

nothing more than unsworn hearsay and argument of counsel."

Van

Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991);
12

see also id. at 1339 ("Given the lack of any actual testimony or
other properly admitted evidence . . . the finding cannot
stand"); Workman, 802 P.2d at 753. All of the State's oral
representations, (R 163-70), which in turn served as the basis
for the Amended Findings and Conclusions, (R 137-39), do not
satisfy the "adequate evidentiary basis" standard of review.

See

Interiors Contracting Inc., 881 P.2d at 931.
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
the court's Amended Findings cannot stand because they relied
improperly on the State's unsubstantiated oral representations.
See Workman, 802 P.2d 749; Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335; Redd,
785 P.2d 1098; cf. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah
1989) ("counsel is precluded from arguing matters not in
evidence").

Lacking "adequate evidentiary support", the trial

court's Amended Findings were clearly erroneous unless otherwise
designated herein.2

(R 137); Interiors Contracting Inc., 881

P.2d at 931.3
2

The original findings and conclusions signed by the court
on November 18, 1994, (R 96-98); (Addendum B ) , should provide the
framework for this appeal.
However, where appropriate, the
discussion herein will also refer to the Amended findings and
conclusions.
(R 136-39); (Addendum C ) .
3

For similar reasons, the State did not meet its burden of
proving its contention that "the defendant entered his earlier
[misdemeanor] plea with the intent to avoid greater punishment."
(R 81) . Although the State acknowledges that on "the evening he
was arrested, [Mr. Williams] told the officer that the gun was
probably stolen[,]" (R 166), the State then inconsistently and
without any factual support argues "that the defendant knew about
the possibility of the next [felony] charge coming down the pike
and entered his [misdemeanor] guilty plea solely to avoid the
further punishment that the felony charge of possession of stolen
13

POINT II
THE THEFT BY RECEIVING CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
PURSUANT TO UTAH AUTHORITY
The court's legal conclusions were in error as well, not
only because of the invalid factual basis, but also because of the
court's misinterpretion of applicable legal authority.
(Addendum C).
A.

(R 136-39)

Mr. Williams begins with Utah's rules and statutes.
THE INVOLVED "ACT" AROSE UNDER A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ONLY ONE PUNISHMENT

As explained below, the theft by receiving charge
should have been dismissed because it stemmed from the same
criminal episode as his prior convictions for carrying a
loaded firearm and carrying a concealed weapon.

(R 67-73) .

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402, states in pertinent part:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode; however, when the same act of
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act
shall be punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such
provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (emphasis added).

property would bring."
(R 167). In contrast to its claims,
however, the State provided no factual evidence in support of its
argument. Moreover, if Mr. Williams had in fact intended to avoid
further punishment, he would have benefitted more by admitting
nothing to the officer because the State then would have lacked
notice of the "charge coming down the pike."
Through his
admission, though, the State now had notice of both the felony and
misdemeanor nature of the charges.
14

11

speech."

'Act7 means a voluntary bodily movement and includes

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1).

If the same voluntary

bodily movement "establish[es] offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act
shall be punishable under only one such provision."

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-1-402 (1) .
For example, in State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah
1983), even though firearms stolen separately in 1980 and in
1981 were found together in defendant Bair's residence,
"'retaining' the stolen property of different individuals is but
a single act and must be prosecuted as only one offense if the
evidence shows, as it clearly does here, that the retention or
possession of such stolen property was simultaneous."
208 (emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408.

Id. at

The State

could not assume and "the evidence [did] not establish that
defendant received the various stolen guns on separate
occassions."

Id. at 207.

In any event, "proof of the date of

the actual 'taking' does not necessarily establish the date of
'receipt' for purposes of the charge of receiving stolen
property . . . "

671 P.2d at 207.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the retention or
possession of the same stolen property was a simultaneous "act"
encompassing all of the charges arising out of the October 1,
1994, episode.

The trial court erred in assuming and the

evidence did not establish that Mr. Williams had received or
possessed "the .357 handgun before he loaded it and concealed it
15

in his vehicle."

(R 137) (Amended Finding No. 3 is clearly

erroneous, having no factual basis other than counsel's oral
representations).

Consequently, the court's conclusions which

were based on Amended Finding No. 3 were also incorrect.

See

(R 138) (Conclusion Nos. 1, 2, 3 ) .
Instead, the charges of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
Weapon, Carrying a Loaded Firearm, and Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property were all based on the following facts:

"On October 1,

. . . police officers responded to a shots fired report. . . .
The defendant was one of the people detained."
Finding No. 1 ) .

(R 136) (Amended

"Detective Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun

in the back seat area of the [suspected] car through the car's
rear window.

A search of the car was performed . . . and a

loaded .357 Magnum revolver was found under the driver's
floormat.

The defendant admitted that he was in possession of

the .357 handgun and that the gun was 'probably stolen.'"

(R

137) (Amended Finding No. 2 ) . The only "act" at issue is the
discovery of the .357 revolver and the defendant's admission.
The above act, however, does not justify the filing of
three separate charges.

No "voluntary bodily movement" or

proven "act" distinguished one charge from another.
Ann. §§ 76-1-402(1); 76-1-601(1).

Utah Code

Because the same act

"establish[ed] offenses which may be punished in different ways
under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision."
§ 76-1-402 (1) .
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Utah Code Ann.

Arguably, the act in question falls under the statutory
proscriptions of each of the involved charges.

See Salt Lake

City Ordinance 11.48.040 (the "Carrying a Loaded Firearm" charge
makes it " unlawful for any person to carry a loaded firearm in
a vehicle . . . " ) ; Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070 ("Carrying
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" makes it "unlawful for any person,
. . . to carry . . . firearms . . . capable of causing death of
serious bodily concealed upon his person"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408(1) ("Theft by Receiving Stolen Property" occurs "if
he receives [or] retains . . . property of another knowing that
it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it");
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) (such a theft is a
second degree felony if the "property stolen is a
firearm . . .") .
However, Mr. Williams has already accepted
responsibility for his "act", having previously "pled guilty to
one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and one count
of Carrying a Loaded Firearm."

(R 137) (Amended Finding No. 6).

His two guilty pleas, entered without formal representation, (R
203),3 were arguably one conviction too many because of the
3

Mr. Williams did not receive the benefit of continual and
formal assistance from an attorney, although at the time of the
arraignment an attorney who had not been appointed to his case may
have been briefly consulted. (R 203).
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sameness of the underlying and simultaneous act.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-1-402(1); see also id. (under the single criminal episode
statute, Mr. Williams' "act shall be punishable under only one
such provision").
Mr. Williams was in fact punished.

(R 212-16).

Theft by Receiving charge should have been dismissed.

The

See also

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) ("if a defendant has been
prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if . . . [t]he subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried . . . [and] . . . [t]he
former prosecution . . . resulted in conviction"); Utah R. Crim.
P. 9.5(1) (emphasis added) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, .
. . [an] information charging multiple offenses . . . arising
from a single criminal episode . . . shall be filed in a single
court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the
highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged"); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-4 02 (2)4; see generally infra Point I.B.

4

The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) have also
been met. Mr. Williams was subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses [the felony and misdemeanor offenses], (R 13 7) (Amended
Findings 5 & 7) ; both offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, the district court, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1);
and the offenses were known to the prosecuting attorney at the time
of arraignment on the first information. Mr. Williams' admission,
"that he was in possession of the .357 handgun and that the gun was
'probably stolen [,]" (R 137) (Amended Finding 2 ) , was known on
October 1, 1994, (R 9 ) , and contained in the same police reports
used by the prosecuting attorney to file both misdemeanor and
felony charges. (R 43, 52, 101, 112).
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B.

RECENTLY ENACTED AUTHORITY REQUIRES
INFORMATIONS TO BE FILED IN THE COURT WITH
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CARRYING THE
HIGHEST POSSIBLE PENALTY OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED

The language of the single criminal episode statute
overlaps in principle with the protections against double
jeopardy.

Cf. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah

1994) ("courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the
case can be decided on other grounds").

The parties here do not

dispute the existence of the double jeopardy protection, (R
67-73; 76-82); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1-6(2)(a); Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(5); Utah Const, art. I,
§ 7; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V; rather, the
issue concerns whether double jeopardy applies to the charges
resulting from the October 1, 1994, incident.

"[N]or shall any

person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" is Utah's
double jeopardy clause.

Utah Const, art. I, § 12; accord U.S.

Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").

State v.

Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), is an opinion similar to, but
distinguishable from, the present double jeopardy situation.
In Sosa, the defendant was charged on June 6, 1977, "with
the misdemeanors of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle and
possession of marijuana."

598 P.2d at 343. On June 29, 1977, a

second information was filed in the district court charging him
"with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted
person."

Id.

The misdemeanor charges were tried in the city
19

court and they resulted in two convictions.

Id.

Since the

felony charge also ended up in a conviction, Sosa appealed it "on
the grounds that the [felony] prosecution was barred by the
'single criminal episode' provision of Utah's Criminal Code and
in violation of the double jeopardy doctrine."

Jd. (footnotes

omitted).
In analyzing Sosa's arguments on appeal, the majority
opinion acknowledged that district courts "have general
jurisdiction over all criminal matters including non-indictable
misdemeanors."

id. at 344.

Despite its acknowledgment, however,

the majority concluded that when city courts and district courts
both have jurisdiction over a misdemeanor offense, the
misdemeanor may be tried in the lower court because "venue [for
the misdemeanor] has historically been held to lie in justice's
and city courts."

Id.

The current rules and statutes, however, have replaced
the historical and "legal right to insist that the action proceed
in the proper venue."

In contrast to a party's past right to

insist that a misdemeanor action proceed in a city (now circuit)
court, see id. (citing State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d
1034 (1941)), Utah authority now demands:
(1)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, . . .
informations charging multiple offenses, which may
include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed
in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged
offense with the highest possible penalty of all the
offenses charged.
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(b) The offenses within the . . . information may
not be separated except by order of the court and for
good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is
adjudicating the . . . information has jurisdicition
over all the offenses charged, and a single
prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5 (emphasis added) (Rule 9.5 is the current
version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9.5, which was enacted in 1989
and later replaced verbatim by the rule).
"On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's
Office filed an Information charging [Mr. Williams] with one
count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and two counts of
Carrying a Loaded Firearm.

Both charges are class B misdemeanor

violations of the city ordinances."

(R 137) (Amended Finding

No. 5). "On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on the
city charges in front of Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey and pled
guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and
one count of Carrying a Loaded Firearm.
dismissed."

The third count was

(R 137) (Amended Finding No. 6). "On October 4,

1994, Detective Cravens . . . screened charges of Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, and Carrying
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor, with the
County Attorney's Office.

The County Attorney issued an

Information charging the defendant with Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property."
137) (Amended Finding No. 7).
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(R

The corresponding court conclusion, that "the Circuit
Court does not have jurisdiction over the second degree felony
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property[,]" (R 138) (Conclusion
Nos. 5-6), misconstrues the focus of the rule.

Rule 9.5

mandates that "informations charging multiple offenses . . .
shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the
charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the
offenses charged."

Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5.

Furthermore, even

assuming that the "single court" mandate did not decide the
matter, filing additional charges arising out of the same
criminal episode still was precluded.

See supra Point II.

The court's rulings were in error and Mr. Williams was
improperly required to again defend himself in district court
after he already had entered two guilty pleas to the misdemeanor
charges arising out of the same criminal episode.

The felony

conviction of theft by receiving stolen property should be
reversed.
C.

THE INFLEXIBLE "SAME-ELEMENTS" FEDERAL
STANDARD SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND REPLACED BY
A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH UNDER UTAH'S
CONSTITUTION

During the proceedings below, the State argued and the
court concluded, "The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property
has different elements than the crimes of Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm."

(R 13 8)

(Amended Finding 4); see also (R 138) (Amended Finding 8) ("The
crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is a separate and
distinct crime from the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous
22

Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm").

The elements are set

forth below.
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property", Utah Code Ann. § 766-4 08, states in pertinent part, "A person commits theft if he
receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding the property from the owner knowing the
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it."
Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (such a theft
is a second degree felony if the "property stolen is a
firearm . . . " ) .

The "Carrying a Loaded Firearm" provision, Salt

Lake City Ordinance 11.48.040, reads, "It is unlawful for any
person to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public
street within the corporate limits of the city."

Id.

The

relevant section of the "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon"
provision, Salt Lake City Ordinace 11.48.040, makes it "unlawful
for any person . . . to carry concealed on his person any
dangerous weapon with the intent or the purpose to use the same
to . . . injure another person, . . . "

Id.

Violations of either

Salt Lake City Ordinance is a class B misdemeanor.

(R 13 7)

(Amended Finding 5).
A "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" class A
misdemeanor charge was also filed because it prohibited, "Any
person . . . [from] carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, . . .
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed
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in a case, gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be
considered a concealed weapon, but . . . [i]f the dangerous
weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he shall be guilty
of a class A misdemeanor . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504.

The

"Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" class A misdemeanor
charge was later dropped, though, as "the County Attorney learned
about the defendant's guilty plea to the city charges

..."

(R 13 7) (Amended Finding 8 ) .
A review of the above statutes indicates that each
offense is different.

As a matter of federal law, the double

jeopardy bar does not apply since "each offense contains an
element not contained in the other[.]"
509 U.S.

United States v. Dixon,

, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct.

(1993)

(construing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932)).

As a matter of state constitutional law, however, the

question remains open.

(R 73) .5

5

While State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), cited the
federal and state constitutions, id. at 345, the text of Utah's
Constitution has since been changed.
Compare Utah Const, art.
VIII, § 7 ("The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution,
and not prohibited by law"), with Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 ("The
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to
issue all extraordinary writs") . Instead of limiting jurisdiction,
in 1989, the legislature enacted a statute which required multiple
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode to "be filed in
a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-9.5. This statutory authority, since repealed
but promulgated into a rule, see Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5, had the
effect of eviscerating Sosa's rationale. No appellate opinions
have interpreted Rule 9.5, leaving open its impact under a (new)
state constitutional analysis.
Other opinions have "nominally"
referred to Utah's double jeopardy clause, see, e.g., Duran v.
24

In support of his state constitutional law argument,
Mr. Williams acknowledged Dixon, but noted its confusing and
unprincipled approach.

(R 73); see also Albernaz v. United

States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (characterizing the law of
double jeopardy as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator").

For

example, under the federal standard Mr. Williams could have been
prosecuted for both the class B misdemeanor charge of "Carrying a
Concealed Dangerous Weapon" provision, Salt Lake City Ordinace
11.48.040, and for the class A misdemeanor charge of "Carrying a
Concealed Dangerous Weapon".

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504.

Even though no additional or different facts were alleged
(the same police reports were used for filing both offenses), the
elements for each "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" charge
were different.

See Salt Lake City Ordinace 11.48.040 (requiring

the elements of intent to injure and concealment on his person
[as opposed to in the car], both of which are absent from its
Utah Code counterpart); c£. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (requiring
the element of a gun containing ammunition which is not
necessarily in its City Ordinance counterpart).

To avoid the

absurdity of a such dual "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon"
convictions under the impractical federal standard, (R 73), the
Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (citing McNair v. Havward, 666
P. 2d 321 (Utah 1983)), although none of those opinions analyzed the
clause in the manner suggested here. The 1993 Dixon concurring and
dissenting opinions, together with the 1990 Grady opinion, also
present additional considerations not previously analyzed under
Utah's Constitution.
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better approach should recognize the guidelines set forth in
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), and in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct.

, 125

(1993) (accompanying the

government's appeal in Dixon was a companion case appealed by a
defendant).
In Grady. the Court held "that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government
will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted."

495 U.S. at 510.

While

the traditional Blockburger test is an appropriate starting
point, "If application of that test reveals that the offenses
have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser
included offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease, and
the subsequent prosecution is barred."

.Id. at 516.

In short,

"Even if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the
imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will
be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution
requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by
the first."

Id. at 519 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,

166-67 n.6 (1977)).
A mere three years passed before Grady was overruled by
a majority opinion in Dixon,6 which adhered strictly to the
6

The members of the Gradv majority opinion changed
dramatically in three years, with the dissenting opinion in Grady
now able to muster a majority for the Dixon opinion. See Grady v.
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rigid

Blockburger test.

Dixon was not without critism, however,

as evidenced by its accompanying concurring and dissenting
opinions:
The same-elements test [of Blockburger! is an
inadequate safeguard, for it leaves the
constitutional guarantee at the mercy of a
legislature's decision to modify statutory
definitions. Significantly, therefore, this
Court has applied an inflexible version of the
same-elements test only once, in 1911, in a
successive prosecution case, and has since noted
that "[t]he Blockburger test is not the only
standard for determining whether successive
prosecutions impermissibly involve the same
offense."
Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 593 (White & Stevens, J.J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 586
(citations omitted) ("To subject an individual to repeated
prosecutions exposes him to 'embarrassment, expense and ordeal,'
violates principles of finality, and increases the risk of a
mistaken conviction").
In another concurring and dissenting opinion in Dixon,
Justice Souter explained "that Grady was correctly decided," and
relied heavily on a case arising out of Utah, In re Nielsen, 131
U.S. 176 (1889).

See Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d at 599, 602 (Souter &

Stevens, J.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part):
The recognition that a Blockburger rule is
insufficient protection against successive
prosecution can be seen as long ago as In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 33 L.Ed. 118, 9 S.Ct. 672
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruleld by United States v. Dixon,
509 U.S. ---, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 569, 113 S.Ct. --- (1993).
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(1889), where we held that conviction for one
statutory offense precluded later prosecution for
another, even though each required proof of a
fact the other did n o t . . . .
[T]he Court held
that a conviction of a Mormon on a charge of
cohabiting with his two wives over a 2 1/2-year
period barred a subsequent prosecution for
adultery with one of them on the day following
the end of that period. . . . [S]trict
application of the Blockburaer test would have
permitted imposition of consecutive sentences. .
. . [C]onviction for adultery required proof
that the defendant had sexual intercourse with
one woman while married to another; conviction
for cohabitation required proof that the
defendant lived with more than one woman at the
same time. Nonetheless, the Court . . . held the
separate offenses to be the 'same.'
Dixon, 125 L.Ed.2d at 602, 605-66 (Souter & Stevens, J.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).

Accordingly, "Grady did nothing more than

apply a version of the Nielsen rule."

Id. at 608.

The principles of Nielsen and Grady should be adopted as
a matter of state constitutional law.

Rather than trying to

apply the inflexible Dixon standard, Utah's historical background
should be kept in perspective.

Cf. Society of Separationists,

Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993) ("We have
encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to use
historical and textual evidence, . . .

to assist us in arriving

at a proper interpretation of the provision in question").
Since many of the framers of Utah's Constitution were
former polygamists, see Flynn, Federalism and Viable State
Government--The History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L.Rev.
311, the 1889 Nielsen principle would have been more in accord
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with the intent behind the 1886 state constitution than "sameelements" federal standard announced by Dixon.

See also

Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (historical "evidence can help in
divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect
of any constitutional interpretation").
Hence, notwithstanding the conclusion that, "The crime of
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has different elements than
the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying
a Loaded Firearm [,]" (R 138) (Amended Finding 4); (R 138)
(Amended Finding 8), "[e]ven if two offenses are sufficiently
different to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences,
successive prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances
where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual
issues already resolved by the first."

Grady, 495 U.S. at 519

(quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977)).
Such a second prosecution should be barred in Mr.
Williams case as there is an identical relitigation of factual
issues already resolved by the first misdemeanor prosecution.
Although "Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon" was not
prosecuted as both as a class A and class B misdemeanor, the same
police reports and factual contentions served as the basis for
those charges and every other charge filed against Mr. Williams.
The "Theft by Receiving" charge requires proof of retaining or
concealing a firearm, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408;
-412(1) (a) (ii), as do the charges of "Carrying a Loaded Firearm"
and "Carrying a Concealed Weapon."
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Salt Lake City Ordinances

11.48.040, -.070.

"[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a

subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of
an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted."

Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.

The court

erred in not dismissing the "Theft by Receiving" charge.

(R 13 8-

39) .
CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the lower court's denial of his motion to dismiss the theft by
receiving charge.
SUBMITTED this

17-

day of May, 1995.

5RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ELIZABETH HUNT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 7. [Jurisdiction of district courts.]
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil
and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, and
a supervisory control of the same. The District Courts or any judge
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary
to carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to give
them a general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their
respective jurisdictions.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Art. VIII, § 5

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal Lcase toi ube a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
"" — * —* -*"- ™-™*Qe Afiaw nnr *h*11 private nroDertv be taken for

Pule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of rightfromthe trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after tie date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
*hall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Ob) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeaL If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not pntArfi«Hi«fro**• A*~+ ~ - J

Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.

Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single court.
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest
possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is abjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged,
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses.
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lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another
appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails
to appear for oral argument.
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided.

76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single
criminal episode means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
uiodent to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
nnSr^m this part shan be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.

76-1-601.

Definitions.

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury* means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily iiyury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
maimer that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily iiyury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) Aperson commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or beUeving that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
,. ,
,. i V
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
m
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
, ,
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
Pr
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(0 as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.

76-10-504.

Carrying concealed dangerous w e a p o n .

(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
except that a forearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case,
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon,
but:
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition,
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall be
a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant*
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) Tb receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) Tb testify in his own behalf;
(d) Tb be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) Tb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) Tb the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) Tb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.

77-35-9.5. Rule 9.5 — Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single court.
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of
state laws, coimty ordinances, or municipal ordi^ ^ T a n d M i s i n g f r o m a single criminal episode
as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged
offense with the highest possible penalty of all
the offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation,
or information may not be separated except by
order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is
adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information
has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a
single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the of-

fenLs.

1989

ii.4o.u4u. carrying Loaaeo rirearm
Prohibited.
A. Carrying Loaded Firearm in Vehicle or on
Street. It is unlawful for any person to carry a
loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public street
within the corporate limits of the city.
B. Definition. A firearm is deemed to be
loaded when:
1. There is an unexpended cartridge, shell or
projectile in the firing position, except in the case
of pistols and revolvers;
2. Revolvers and pistols shall be deemed
loaded when the unexpended cartridge, shell or
projectile is in a position that the manual
operation of any mechanism once would cause the
unexpended cartridge, shell or projectile to be
fired; and
3. A muzzle-loading firearm is capped or
primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot
in the barrel or cylinders. (Prior code $ 32-6-6.1)

11.48.070. Concealed Weapons.
A. It is unlawful for any person, except a
peace officer, to carry any slingshot, brass
knuckles, firearms, daggers, stiletto, nunchaku
stick, or any other instrument or object capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury concealed
upon his person.
B. It is unlawful for any person, except a
peace officer, to carry concealed on his person any
dangerous weapon with the intent or the purpose
to use the same to harm, maim or injure another
person, animal or thing. For the purpose of this
subsection:
1. "Dangerous weapon" means any item that,
in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury; and
2. In construing whether or not an object or
tiling not commonly known as a dangerous
weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of
the wound produced, if any, and the manner in
which the instrument, object or thing was used or
intended to be used, are factors which the court
shall take into account in deciding the question.
(Prior code § 32-6-3)
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and
Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss

JASON WILLIAMS,
Case No. 941901462FS
Defendant.
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson
This matter came on for hearing on November 17, 1994. The
State was represented by Richard Hamp.

The defendant was present

and was represented by Elizabeth Hunt.

The Court considered

memoranda, cases submitted by the parties, materials submitted by
defense counsel regarding the filing of a city and a state case
against Mr. Williams, and argument by counsel.

Now being fully

apprised in the matter, the Court denies the defendant's motion
and enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 3, 1994, Jason Williams was charged by Salt Lake
City in a three count information with two counts of carrying a
loaded firearm, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
11.48.040, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon, in
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.40.070 in Salt Lake City

ft ft n n Q fi

v. Jason Williams, case number 941016768.
2. He was arraigned on October 4, 1994, and pled

to one count

of carrying a loaded firearm and one count of carrying a
concealed weapon.
3. He was sentenced by Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey on
November 2, 1994.
4. In this case, the State filed an information on October 4,
1994, charging Mr. Williams with theft by receiving stolen
property, a violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-409, and
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a violation of Utah Code
Ann. section 76-10-504.
5. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the count alleging
carrying a concealed weapon, and the motion was granted.
6. Both cases are premised on facts allegedly occurring on
October 1, 1994, wherein the police conducted a warrantless
search of a car containing two loaded firearms.
7. Both cases were filed in the Third Circuit Court before
Judge Pro Tern T. Patrick Casey.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Because the elements of the offenses in the City case are
different from the elements of the offense charged in the State
case, there is no violation of the defendant's rights against
double jeopardy.
2. Because the offenses charged in the City case and the
offense charged in the State case did not occur in the same

criminal episode, there is no violation of the Utah statutes
pertaining to prosecutions of single criminal episodes.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing, the Court
hereby orders that the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
DATED this

day of November, 1994.
By the Court:

THE HONORABLE
HOMER F. WILKINSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

RICHARD HAMP
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion
to Deputy County Attorney this

day of

. 1994,

flonoas
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]I
]I

AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

]1

CaseNo.941901462FS

]i

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

V.

JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS,
Defendant.

The above case was set for hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on November
17, 1994, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge. The Plaintiff, the
State of Utah, was represented by Richard G. Hamp, Deputy County Attorney, and the
Defendant, Jason Scott Williams, was represented by his attorney, Elizabeth Hunt. Written
memoranda and oral argument was presented to the Court. The Court being fully advised hereby
finds the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 1, 1994, Detective Kent Cravens of the Metro Gang Unit and other police
officers responded to a shots fired report. Five members of the gangs "QVO" or "BMG" were
detained by the police officers. The defendant was one of the people detained.
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2. A 1981 silver Datsun 310 car was parked nearby. The defendant had driven the car to
the area. Detective Cravens observed a sawed off shotgun in the back seat area of the car
through the car's rear window. A search of the car was performed by Detective Cravens and a
loaded .357 Magnum revolver was found under the driver's floormat. The defendant admitted
that he was in possession of the .357 handgun and that the gun was "probably stolen." The .357
Magnum was not listed on NCIC as stolen at this time.
3. The defendant received and took possession of the .357 handgun before he loaded it
and concealed it in his vehicle.
4. The defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail for Possession
of a Concealed Weapon and Possession of a Loaded Firearm in a Vehicle. Both of these charges
were misdemeanor Salt Lake City ordinance violations.
5. On October 3, 1994, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office filed an Information
charging Scott Wilkerson, an alias of the defendant, with one count of Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon and two counts of Carrying a Loaded Firearm. Both charges are class B
misdemeanor violations of the city ordinances.
6. On October 4, 1994, the defendant was arraigned on the city charges in front of Judge
Pro Tern Patrick Casey and pled guilty to one count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon
and one count of Carrying a Loaded Firearm. The third count was dismissed.
7. On October 4, 1994, Detective Cravens checked the NCIC listings again and the .357
Magnum was listed as stolen. Detective Cravens screened charges of Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property, a second degree felony, and Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A
misdemeanor, with the County Attorney's Office. The County Attorney issued an Information
charging the defendant with Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property.
8. On October 11, 1994, the County Attorney learned about the defendant's guilty plea to
the city charges and dismissed the class A carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charge.
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9. A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Pro Tern Patrick Casey on October 18,
1994, and the defendant was bound over to the district court on the second degree felony charge
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was committed and completed when
the defendant took possession of the stolen .357 Magnum handgun.
2. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded
Firearm occurred and were completed when the defendant loaded and concealed the .357
Magnum handgun in the car that he was driving.
3. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was completed before the defendant
committed the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded
Firearm.
4. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property has different elements than the
crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm.
5. The jurisdiction for the second degree Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is in the
District Court. The Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over the second degree felony of
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.
6. The Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the
second degree felony Theft by Receiving Stolen Property charge. Jurisdiction to prosecute this
offense was only in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
7. The offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property was not known to the prosecution
at the time that the Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon charges were filed.
8. The crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is a separate and distinct crime from
the crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm.

000138

9.

The defendant was not placed in double jeopardy under the clauses of either the

Utah State Consitution or the Federal Constitution.
10. The crimes of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded
Firearm were not committed as part of the same criminal episode as the crime of Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property within the meaning of Section 76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated 1953
as Amended.

DATED this _^
^

day of Deeembcrr
Sciuiibu, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Elizabeth Hunt
Attorney for the Defendant
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ELIZABETH HUNT #5292
Attorney for Mr. Williams
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Objections to State's
Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law

v.
Case No.

941900S£*FS

JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant.
Defendant, Jason Scott Williams, hereby objects to
the State's amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
copy of which is attached.
As a general matter, the proposed findings exceed the
evidence and the Court's analysis.

Aside from the court dockets,

the only items of evidence presented for the Court's
consideration on the motion were the police reports submitted by
defense counsel.
Mr. Williams objects to the following specific

FINDINGS OF FACT
7. There was no evidence presented regarding when
Detective Cravens verified that the gun was stolen on NCIC, or
when he screened the case with the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office.
8. There was no evidence presented regarding when the
County Attorney learned about Mr. Williams plea to the city
charges.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The crime of theft by receiving property was
occurring at the same time as the city misdemeanor weapons
offenses.
1994.

Both the State and City Informations charge October 1,

Both Count I of the information in the State case and the

probable cause statement refer to the facts on October lf 1994 at
975 South and 300 West.
2. The crime of carrying a loaded firearm was
occurring on October 1, 1994, the same time as the theft by
receiving.

It appears that the crime of carrying a concealed

weapon never occurred in this case, inasmuch as there is no
evidence that Mr. Williams carried the gun on his person.

Salt

Lake City Ordinance 11.48.070.
3. The crimes alleged in the city and state cases
were occurring simultaneously on October 1, 1994.
4. The circuit court magistrates had initial
jurisdiction over both the city and state charges, and the
district court had ultimate jurisdiction over the charges in both

cases•
5. While the city prosecutor's office had
discretionary jurisdiction over the city charges, the state
prosecutor's office had jurisdiction over all charges
contemplated in the city and state cases.
6. The prosecution had all the evidence necessary to
the theft by receiving charge at the time that the other
misdemeanor charges were filed.
Mr. Williams has no objection to the proposed court
order submitted by the state.

Respectfully submitted this /(

day of 1 )vL

1994.

n,

zaffe^ti^HtaHt
ElilzaBeth
"I^it
Attorney for Mr. Williams

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion
Is
to the Deputy County Attorney this

day of

1994.

